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"BLACK' HAWALA

"BLACK" HAWALA: CONFRONTING

ISIL ON THE

FINANCIAL FRONT

KELSEY MowATT-LARSSEN*

l. INTRODUCTION
Hawala is an alternative remittance system 1 developed in the Middle East, allowing for the
transfer of money outside of formal financial institutions. 2 Hawaladars, or hawala dealers, operate
informally to organize the movement of cash, or its value equivalent, between customers. 3 Because
there is typically no record of the transaction, hawala is associated with money-laundering and
terrorist financing. 4
The Islamic State oflraq and the Levant ("ISIL"), otherwise known as The Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria ("ISIS"), ad-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-'Iraq wa-sh-Sham, Daesh, or Dawla al Islamiya
(hereinafter ISIL) is the most financially sophisticated terrorist organization in operation today. 5 The
group's diversified marketing strategy has encouraged support from sympathizers across the globe,
often in the form of cash donations. 6 Historically, hawala has been complicit in such transactions for
its anonymity and efficiency.7 A sympathizer in the United States can send money to fighters in the
Middle East without any paper trail. 8
' Kelsey Mowatt-Larssen is a graduate of American University Washington College of Law (2016) and Barnard College,
Columbia University (2013). She has been selected for Active Duty in the Army JAG Corps for FY16. She would like to
thank Professor Daniel Marcus and Andrew Rejent for their significant benefactions to this piece.
1
Fm. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FrnCEN ADVISORY 1-2 (Mar. 2003), https://www.fincen.gov/news_room/
rp/advisory/pdf/advis33.pdf (including "alternative remittance systems" within its definition of"informal value transfer
systems" (IVTs), which are systems or networks of people that receive money for the purpose of making its value payable
to a third party elsewhere. While IVTs may intersect with formal financial institutions, they typically operate outside of
conventional banking systems).
2
Charles B. Bowers, Hawala, Money-Laundering, and Terrorism Finance: Micro-Lending As An End to Illicit Remittance,
37 DENY.]. INT'L & Pm'y 379, 379 (2009) (explaining hawala is often defined as "money transfer without movement"
because it travels without movement in formal financial institutions).
3
FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, THE HAWALA ALTERNATIVE REMITTANCE SYSTEM AND ITS ROLE IN MONEY
LAUNDERING 9 (Jan. 2000), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/ terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/FinCENHawala-rpt. pdf [hereinafter FINCENJ (highlighting the "cost effectiveness" in operating out of rented storefronts as
opposed to a bank building).
4
Bowers, supra note 2, at 383 (suggesting hawala is popular because of cultural familiarity, affordability, anonymity, and
an absence of formal sector alternatives).
5 See Kathleen Caulderwood, Islamic State: How Terrorist Groups Move Millions Without a Paper Trail, INT'L Bus. TIMES
(Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.com/islamic-state-how-terrorist-groups-move-millions-without-paper-trail- l 698544
(defining the Islamic State group as the richest terrorist entity on the planet).
6
E.g., Justin Sink, ISIS Rakes in Donations on Twitter, HILL (Oct. 23, 2014) http://thehill.com/policy/defense/221666isis-rakes-in-donations-on-twitter (quoting David Cohen: "I think there's no question that ISIL is among the bestfinanced terrorist organizations, leaving aside state-sponsored terrorist organizations, that we've confronted").
7
See generally Caulderwood, supra note 5 (statement of Colin Clarke, associate political scientist and threat finance
expert at RAND Corporation) ("[H]awala is so difficult to track because "regular people use [it] ... it would be a lot
easier if it was only dirty money.").
8
See FINCEN, supra note 3, at 7-8, for an example of how an anonymous, illicit transaction lacks records.
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Hawala is legal in many jurisdictions, despite this potential for misuse. 9 The United States
has effectively responded to the threat of "black'' hawala, Io especially since the rise of ISIL, while the
Middle East is still reluctant to abandon tradition, even for the sake of international security.
This paper will first analyze the history of hawala and its probable association to ISIL.
This paper will then examine U.S. measures in combatting hawala, especially after the September
11 attacks. The United States is wiling and able to prosecute suspected terrorist financiers, but
as this paper's discussion on hawala within the Middle East reveals, countries lacking formal
sector alternatives are compromising U.S. efforts. In order to impose a truly effective regulatory
scheme, this paper concludes, the United States and Middle Eastern states must reach a common
understanding on hawala, and enforce this understanding through an international convention.

IL

HAWALA AS AN ALTERNATIVE REMITTANCE SYSTEM

A remittance is best defined as the money that migrant workers send back to their country or
origin. II Hawala, a type of remittance system established in the Middle East centuries ago, became
especially popular in the 1990s following the rising costs of formal sector alternatives and currency
exchange rates. I 2 Now, the sum of informal and formal remittance flows is around $350 billion
annually. I 3
Hawala is based on cultural or historical ties and is often ethnically exclusive. I 4 This
familiarity allows money to pass through recipients quickly and discreetly. I 5 Transactions are
generated through hawaladars - persons in a country that accept a sum of money for transfer to
a recipient in another, usually foreign, location. I 6 The hawaladar connects to a hawaladar in the
recipient location, who facilitates the exchange and retains a small commission. I 7 This process creates
a liability from the first hawaladar to the second and the debt is settled through trust; typically,
9

FINCEN, supra note 3, at 11 (turning the question of whether hawala is illegal on the regulations governing
remittance services and the circumstances of the remittance).
10
See FINCEN, supra note 3, at 12 (offering the distinction between "white" hawala transactions, which are
remittances, and "black'' hawala transactions, with are associated with a serious offense, such as narcotics trafficking or
fraud).
11
Bowers, supra note 2, at 381.
12
Bowers, supra note 2, at 379 (noting that "hawala'' is part of the lexicon of certain countries and is known to represent
transfer or collection).
13
Bowers, supra note 2, at 382 (stressing that this is a conservative estimate, since countries are unable to fully measure
remittances through informal channels).
14
Bowers, supra note 2, at 383-84 (statement of Saeed al-Hamiz, Executive Director of the Banking Supervision and
Examination Department of the Central Bank of the U .A.E) ("Hawala ... predates bank transfers by hundreds of years.
During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the development of trade between regions called for the establishment of
reliable and trustworthy instruments to finance those transactions.").
15
See Bowers, supra note 2, at 383.
16
FINCEN, supra note 3, at 7 (illustrating the four people involved in hawala transactions: the initial person, the
hawaladar, the hawaladar in the recipient country, and the recipient).
17
See FINCEN, supra note 3, at 7, for an example of a hawala transaction; when transmitting 180,000 Pakistani
Rupees, the hawaladar can retain a fee of one Rupee for each dollar transferred and a fee of thirty-seven Rupees per
dollar, delivery included.
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hawaladars import/export goods to each other and manipulate invoices to disguise the purpose of the
shipment. 18 There is no record of the transaction. 19
Hawala is a practical option in places that lack formal sector alternatives, including many
places in the Middle East. 20 Unlike traditional financial institutions, hawala requires minimal capital
and commitment. 21 Whereas, a bank requires an account before conducting business and charges a
bank draft fee, hawaladars only ask a one to two percent fee from the value remitted. 22 There are no
hidden costs or technical stipulations. 23
Hawaladars operate out of storefronts with only a notebook and a cellphone. 24 Often, the
store is advertised as another business, such as a "music bazaar" or "tea shop." 25 Whether deliberate
or not, this classifies most remittance companies as commercial entities rather than financial
institutions, thereby exempting them from regulatory and reporting requirements. 26 This lack of
oversight creates great permissibility for illegal transactions. 27
It is no surprise that hawala is trusted as a successful method for transferring funds; the
system's perseverance through centuries is testament to its workability. 28 Banking sectors have
modernized, laws have developed, and technology has advanced, but hawala is still preferred in many
areas over the formal financial sector. 29 This may not be a problem if the preference ended with
18

FINCEN, supra note 3, at 8 (explaining that the initial hawaladar and recipient hawaladar are part of the same
network and operate as business partners. An import/export business allows the hawaladars to "conceal" the movement of
money. The initial hawaladar may ship the recipient hawaladar telecommunications, for example, in the amount owed,
and invoice the recipient hawaladar less than the value of the goods). See Bowers, supra note 2, at 381 (defining this
process as "countervaluation'' - the settling of accounts through trade rather than transfer).
19
See generally FINCEN, supra note 3, at 7 (highlighting the need for trust because the hawaladar does not give a receipt
to the customer; the hawaladar trusts the recipient hawaladar to give the money to the recipient without recordkeeping).
20
E.g., SAMUEL MuNZELE MAIMBO, WORLD BANK, WORKING PAPER No. I3, THE MONEY ExcHANGE DEALERS OF
KABUL: A STUDY OF THE HAwALA SYSTEMS IN AFGHANISTAN 20 (2003), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/10/16/000090341_20031016085357/Rendered/PDF/269720PAPEROMoney
OexchangeOdealers. pdf (adding, in Afghanistan, hawaladars provide the only alternative to a weak commercial banking
system).
21
See FINCEN, supra note 3, at 9 (noting a major bank prefers a customer open an account before doing business and
demands exchange rates and bank drafts).
22
Bowers, supra note 2, at 384 (attributing the low prices to low costs - hawaladars can charge less because they often
share costs of infrastructure, in contrast to stand-alone banks).
23
E.g., FINCEN, supra note 3, at 9 (listing the lack of bureaucracy as a motivation for using hawala, especially for
people lacking proper identification).
24
FINCEN, supra note 3, at 10 (discussing how low operational costs minimize overhead expenses).
25
FINCEN, supra note 3, at 10 (explaining that remittances services easily fit into existing business activity; because
money transfers are usually necessary in any business, hawaladars can process hawala transactions through the same store
bank account).
26
Bowers, supra note 2, at 382 (equating exemptions to a lack of uniformity in remittance classification. Adding, even
when the transfer companies register as financial institutions, they do not report the details of transactions).
27
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
28
E.g., NAT'L COMMN ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING: STAFF REPORT
TO THE COMMISSION (2004) [hereinafter MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING] (explaining that Al-Qaeda preferred
hawala over formal financial institutions because the system is not subject to potential government oversight). See, e.g.,
Bowers, supra note 2, at 382 (stating that by 2005, formal global remittances exceeded $233 billion).
29
See Bowers, supra note 2, at 383 (defining the four incentives to hawala as the absence of formal sector alternatives,
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expatriates and migrants, but it invites terrorists to hide behind a veil of cultural tradition. 30
Ironically, the primary challenge for law enforcement with hawala is its legality. 31 Hawala
is a legitimate remittance system. 32 Hawaladars operate for the benefit of many workers and
families across the world and typically comply with money-transmitting legislation. 33 However,
we should not turn a blind eye to the system simply because most remittances are spent for lawful
purposes. Consider: the 9/11 attacks are estimated to have cost only $300,000 to $500,000 - this is
0.000003% of the total amount of informal remittances this past year. 34 If we objectively attributed
that 0.000003% of underground transfers to terrorist financing, we may have considered that figure
inconsequential. 35 Shortly after the attacks, Osama bin Laden dismissed Western efforts to identify
and seize Al-Qaeda's assets, stating in a Pakistani press interview, ''Al Qaeda is comprised of modern,
educated young people who are as aware of the cracks in the Western financial system as they are
of the lines in their own hands. These are the very flaws in the Western financial system which is
becoming a noose for it." 36

A. The Islamic State ofIraq and the Levant

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant started as an Al-Qaeda splinter group with the
initial mission of creating an Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. 37 The leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI),
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi Al-Zarqawi, was killed in an air strike in 2006 but was quickly replaced; his
AQI replacement, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, announced the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) the same year. 38
Leadership eventually passed to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi after al-Baghdadi was released from Camp
Bucca, a United States-run prison in southern Iraq, in 2009. 39 IS renamed itselfISIS after merging
cultural familiarly, affordability, and anonymity).
See generally Amos N. Guiora & Brian J. Field, Using And Abusing The Financial Markets: Money Laundering As The
Achilles' Heel O/Terrorism, 29 U. PA.]. INT'L L. 67, 77 (2007) (referencing the Abu Dhabi Declaration on Hawala to
explain the need for higher regulation).
31
See, e.g., FINCEN, supra note 3, at 11 (explaining that hawala is illegal in some parts of the US from a regulatory
standpoint, but remittance systems are not universally illegal).
32
See FINCEN, supra note 3, at 5 (correcting the misconception that hawala is "underground banking;" hawalas often
operate in the open with complete legitimacy).
33
See Suha Maayeh, Hawala Money Transfers DefY Regulation Efforts, NATIONAL (Aug. 26, 2008), http://www.
thenational.ae/ news/uae-news/hawala-money-transfers-defy-regulation-efforts (using an example of workers in Dubai
who use hawaladars as banks to illustrate the effectiveness of hawala in sending money home to families); see also Bowers,
supra note 2, at 386 (accounting for the reluctance in poorer countries to cut off a viable channel for money flow).
34
Bowers, supra note 2, at 381-82, 387 (calculating informal remittances account for about $115 billion of the $350
billion of annual remittance flows).
35
See Bowers, supra note 2, at 387 (pointing out that most terrorist attacks require even less than $100,000).
36
Bowers, supra note 2, at 407.
37
ISIS Fast Facts, CNN (Nov. 1, 2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts/; What is Islamic
State, BBC (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29052144 (tracing IS' announcement of a
caliphate on June 29, 2014).
38
Id. (noting Jordanian-born Abu Musab al-Zarqawi created AQI in 2003 and pledged a war against the Shia
community three years later).
39
Id. (detailing the initial leadership, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayyub al-Masri, were killed in a joint United
30
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with Jahbat al-Nusra, an Al-Qaeda backed militant group in Syria. 40 After fighting between alNusra and ISIS, Al Qaeda renounced all ties to ISIS on February 3, 2014. 41 Since that date, the
group has kidnapped children in Syria for radicalization, seized airports and public buildings, freed
dangerous prisoners, executed captives, and expanded its territory. 42 On June 29, 2014, Al-Baghdadi
declared himself as the authority over the world's 1.5 billion Muslims and announced the creation
of a caliphate (Islamic state). 43 Since the drafting of an Authorization for the Use of Military Force
(AUMF) against the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,'' 44 the group is commonly referred to as
"ISIL" within the United States, and will hereinafter be referred to as ISIL within this paper.
Although it has disassociated from Al-Qaeda, ISIL still deploys the Al-Qaeda operative:
"There are two things a brother must always have for jihad, the self and money,'' and is now the
richest terrorist entity on the planet. 45 As ISIL was developing, the group received material support
from sympathizers in Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. 46 Wealthy businessmen gave money to ISIL
the same way businessmen back start-ups in the United States.47 These jurisdictions continue to
fund extremists in Iraq and Syria, giving ISIL the footing to generate its own capital and expand its
territory. 48
Laws combating the financing of terrorism often overlook hawala, suggesting that much of
ISII..:s donations are conveyed through hawaladars. 49 To move money within the Middle East, an
ISIL supporter would contact a hawaladar and provide instruction for delivery and the hawaladar
would retain a profit. 50 The hawaladar in, say, Qatar would contact the counterpart hawaladar in
States-Iraqi operation).
Id. (adding the Jahbat al-Nusra leader, Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani, rejected ISIS's attempt to merge with the group in
April 2013).
41
Id. (remembering that ISIS started as an AQ splinter group).
42
Id. (chronicling between May 2014 and present-day, ISIS has publicly decapitated Western journalists and aid
workers, urging the US into action. In response, leader al-Baghdadi calls the United States "terrified, weak, and
powerless" in a seventeen-minute audio message released on November 13, 2014).
43
Id. (adding since this time, the US has sent extra troops to Iraq (June 2014), bombed artillery of Sunni Islamic
extremists (Aug. 2014), and carried out airstrikes against the group (Sep. 2014-present)).
44
See WHITE HousE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/aumf_02112015.pdf(last visited May 9,
2016) for a draft version of the "Authorization for Use of Military Force against the Islamic State oflraq and the Levant,"
proposing to repeal The Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002).
45
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
46
See Matthew Levitt, Qatar's Not-So-Charitable Record on Terror Finance, HILL (Sept. 24, 2014), http://thehill.com/
biogs/ pundits-blog/in ternational/2187 06-qatars-not-so-charitable-record-on-terror-finance (recounting an experience
with Qatari officials in Doha who denied hawalas in their country. In a separate investigation, foreign workers told
IMF assessors they sent money to their families using hawala; the IMF team returned to the government with a list of
hawaladars and demanded implementation oflaws combating terrorist financing).
47
See id. (quoting Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hammad ad Thani's concession to German Chancellor Angela
Merkel that "[Extremists in Syria and Iraq] are partly financed from abroad." Knowing this, the Department of the
Treasury singled out Qatar as a "permissive jurisdiction'' for terrorist financing).
40

48
49

See id.
E.g., ]OHN A. CASSARA, HIDE

& SEEK: INTELLIGENCE, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND THE STALLED WAR ON TERRORIST
FINANCE 144 (2006) ("As I saw in the Middle East, most hawala networks are based on tribal, clan, and family
relationships, making it difficult for U.S. criminal investigators to understand and interdict the system.").
50
Id. at 148 (examining "Case l ," where the hawaladar keeps for profit a small percentage of the amount transferred).
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the ISIL state and communicate instructions. 51 The hawaladar in the recipient state would contact
the recipient and verify the transaction through a remittance code, and arrange for delivery. 52 This
hawaladar also retains a small fee. The funds move between the countries, and the hawaladars
eventually "settle the books" through either a physical transfer of money, a bank-to-bank wire
transfer, trade, or "counter valuation" gold. 53
To recruit outside of the Middle East, ISIL targets social media; the group is unparalleled in
its use of Facebook, Twitter, You Tube, and other popular websites. 54 ISIL has gained support from
not only Islamic extremists, but from Westerners. 55 United States and European security services
estimate as many as 3,000 jihadist militants fighting in Iraq and Syria originate from Western
countries. 56 Another, perhaps equally sizable, number has donated to the cause. 57 The group has
effectively rebranded itself to surpass a declining Al Qaeda, and "Islamic State" is the product they
are selling. 58 Thousands of people are buying, and they are using hawala. 59
Because ISIL and hawala both demand secrecy, it is difficult to qualify their relationship.
What we do know is that ISIL is running a de facto state and has achieved unprecedented success
in marketing. 60 ISIL needs money and knows how to get it. Given hawala's history of financing
terrorism, we should assume the system is contributing to the illicit transfer of funds to ISIL. 61

51

Id. (continuing with "Case l," the hawaladar in Country A contacts the counterpart in Country B through telephone,
email or fax to communicate instructions for delivery to the recipient).
52
Id. (finishing "Case l," the hawaladar in Country B verifies the transaction with the recipient through a remittance
code sent from the sender to the recipient).
53
Id. (calling this process "door-to-door" money remitting).
54
See generally Jim Armitage, ISIS is Refining Terrorist Marketing, INDEPENDENT (July 4, 2014), http://www.
independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/jim-armitage-isis-is-refining-terrorist-marketing-9585963.html
(equating ISIS marketing to the corporate world's technique of connecting to a new generation of young adults).
55 See Ben Winsor, Hundreds o/Westerners Have joined ISIS - Here's Where They Came From, Bus. INSIDER (Aug. 27,
2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-is-recruiting-westerners-countries-2014-8 (pointing out that Westerners
present an even greater challenge to security services because Western passports are not subject to the same visa
requirements as non-Westerns).
56
See id. (estimating 700 recruits from France, 400 from the U.K., 320 from Germany, 250 from Belgium, 200 from
Australia, 130 from the Netherlands, 100 from Canada, 100 from the United States, and 51 from Spain).
57
See Sink, supra note 6 (statement of David Cohen) ("You see these appeals on Twitter in particular from, you
know, well-know terrorist financiers ... and they're quite explicit that these are to be made to ISIL for their military
campaign.").
58
See Armitage, supra note 54 (using the analogy of"Microsoft" for Al-Qaeda and "Apple" for ISIS).
59
See infta note 190 and accompanying text.
60
See generally Eoghan Macguire, How has ISIS Become One ofthe Richest Ever Militant Groups, CNN (June 22, 2014),
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/22/world/ meast/ mme-isis-money/index.html (noting that as ISIS has expanded from
northern Syria across western Iraq, reports put the group's wealth at $2 billion).
61
See generally Guiora & Field, supra note 30, at 60 ("[T]errorists have discovered various methods of using the financial
markets to fund their activities. For instance, they use the investment realm, the banking systems, and particularly the
informal value transfer system ofhawalas.").
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UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO HAWALA

The United States started thinking critically about hawala after 9/11. 62 The money involved
in hawala is "clean" at the time of transfer, but legislative efforts before 9/11 focused primarily on
the movement of "dirty'' money across borders. 63 Since 9/11, money-transmitting legislation has
expanded to target specific threats to United States security. 64 Now, money-laundering crimes are
increasingly considered in the context of anti-terrorism provisions. 65 The implications of this shift are
apparent through two factually similar, yet legally distinguishable, cases: United States v. Eljgeeh in
2004 and United States v. Eljgeeh in 2014.

A. Post-9111 Legislation
Before 9 /11, most legislation concerning remittance systems focused on the formal sector. 66
18 U.S.C Section 1960(a) criminalized any "illegal" money transmitting business affecting interstate
or foreign commerce, meaning the business was intentionally operated without an appropriate
money-transmitting license and failed to comply with money transmitting business registration
requirements.67 Often used in conjunction with 18 U.S.C Section 1960, 18 U.S.C. Section 371
criminalized conspiracy to defraud the United States. 68 This legislation failed to account for hawala
since the system mostly operates outside the formal sector. 69
After 9/11, the USA PATRIOT Act placed regulations on the informal sector. 70 The Act
amended Section 1960 to substitute provisions relating to the prohibition of unlicensed money
transmitting businesses for similar provisions relating to prohibition of illegal money transmitting
businesses. 71 In other words, the post-October 2001 version of Section 1960 punishes failure to
62

E.g., Bowers, supra note 2, at 386 ("Only after the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon did knee-jerk
speculation by various federal agencies bring the presumed relationship between hawala and terrorism finance to the
forefront.").
63
Guiora & Field, supra note 30, at 65-66.
64
See Guiora & Field, supra note 30, at 82 (highlighting the PATRIOT Act as a way to "patch many of the ... holes
through which terror financiers have slipped").
65
See CASSARA, supra note 49, at 191 (explaining that countermeasures against money laundering and terrorist financing
are very similar because terrorist financing is an inverse partner to money laundering).
66
See generally Bowers, supra note 2, at 402 (noting several loopholes to formal sector regulation).
67
Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 1960 (West 2000) (amended 2001), with 18 U.S.C.A. § 1960 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007)
(replacing an "illegal money transmitting business" with an "unlicensed money-transmitting business" in punishing,
with a fine or five years imprisonment, anyone who "conduct[ed], control[led], manage[d], supervise[d], direct[ed], or
own[ed]" the business).
68
18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000) (punishing with five years anyone who ... "conspire[s] either to commit any offense against
the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose ... ").
69
See Bowers, supra note 2, at 406-07 (explaining that Informal Value Transfer Systems (IVTSs) operate underground,
parallel to the formal sector, and are more difficult to deal with than systems operating in tandem with the formal sector).
70
See Bowers, supra note 2, at 406 (defining IVTSs as "informal value transfer systems" included in Section 359 of the
Patriot Act).
71
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(USA PATRIOT) Act of2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. See H.R. Rep. No. 107-250, at 54 (2001) (explaining
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comply with money transmitting business registration requirements regardless of whether the
defendant knew that the operation needed to be licensed or that the operation was so punishable. 72
Hawala may have been indirectly implicated through existing law, but it is now explicitly accounted
for as an informal value transfer banking system. 73
Terrorist funding is now largely prosecuted using this legislation, along with 18 U.S.C
Section 2339B(a)(l), which criminalizes attempts to provide material support to terrorist
organizations where the subject knew the organization was a designated terrorist organization or
engages in terrorism. 74

B. United States v. Eljgeeh
In 2004, a grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York returned a four-count indictment of Abad Elfgeeh and his nephew Aref Elfgeeh (defendants)
for violating federal law through their operation of a hawala. 75 Abad's counts included conspiring,
between January 1995 and October 2001, to conduct a business (the hawala), "knowing that ... [it]
was an illegal money transmitting business" in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1960(a)(1994) and
conspiring to conduct an unlicensed money-transmitting operation between November 2001 and
January 2003, when the new version of Section 1960(a) had become effective. 76
Abad supported customers in Yemen through a strategy designed to evade the IRS. 77 Each
check made out to Yemen was under $10,000 or given in cash to Abad's Carnival French Ice Cream
Store, and deposited from the store's account at J.P. Morgan Chase Bank into 12 "feeder" accounts,
maintained at other, various banks. 78 More checks were written on an alternative Prospect Deli
that an offense under 1960 is a general intent crime, meaning a defendant is liable ifhe knowingly operates an unlicensed
money transmitting business. The Government does not have to show that a defendant knew a state license was required
for purposes of a criminal prosecution.).
72
18 U.S.C.A. § 1960(b)(l)(A) (sanctioning a business "whether or not the defendant knew that the operation was
required to be licensed or that the operation was so punishable").
73
H.R. Rep. No. 107-250, at 63-64 ("Although the Committee believe[d] that informal value transfer banking systems
like hawalas [were] already adequately covered by references to money transmitting businesses in certain provisions of
existing law, this section [made] that understanding explicit.").
74
18 U.S.C.A § 2339B(a)(l) (2006) (stating, "[w]hoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign
terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined ... or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both,
and, if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life ... ").
75
Superseding Indictment, United States v. Elfgeeh, No. 1:03-CR-00133-SJ (E.D.N.Y June 9, 2004) (adding a count
for structuring in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)); see also United States v. Elfgeeh, 515 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2008),
ajf'g United States v. Elfgeeh, 2004 WL 3767299 at *l (E.D.N.Y Jun. 9, 2004) ("A Hawala operates in a similar fashion
to a Western Union business. It's a money transfer operation. The word Hawala translated from Arabic into English
means transfer ... [A] Hawala business is used to send money from one location to another.").
76
Superseding Indictment, E/fieeh, No. 1:03-CR-00133-SJ (adding a count to the original indictment for structuring in
violation of31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)).
77
E/fieeh, 515 F.3d at 110 (explaining that when you enter a bank with an amount of cash over $10,000, you must give
information for a Currency Transaction Report, which is eventually filed with the Internal Revenue Service and tracked
by the government).
78
Id. at 109.
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account, payable to the Carnival French Ice Cream Account, and signed in the name of Abad's
nephew, Are£79 At trial, Aref conceded he worked in a hawala business and was responsible for
opening up several bank accounts and making deposits of cash in these accounts in exchange for
room, board, and a small salary. so Abad also retained a salary in exchange for sending money to
Yemen - around $3,000. si Critical to the case, neither Abad nor Aref, nor their Carnival French Ice
Cream store, had a New York State license to transmit money.s 2 Both defendants argued their hawala
was a "service" to the Yemeni community and not a "business" within the meaning of Section 1960,
but the New York State Banking Department countered that a money-transmitting business does not
need to take in revenue or consider itself profitable in the traditional conception of "business" to fall
under the licensing requirement.s 3
The government agreed it would not discuss the involvement of the FBI's counterterrorism
task force or discuss a terrorism investigation. s4 Further, the court reiterated "this is not a terrorism
trial ... this is a banking violation" trial concerning hawalas not obtaining proper licenses to conduct
business. s5 As such, the government was precluded from allowing the jury to view checks seized from
Abad with the words "for the jihad" and "mujahidin'' written on them. sG
The Second Circuit agreed with the sentences imposed on Abad and Aref, refuting the
defendants' contention that the terms were substantively unreasonable or unwarrantedly high for
the crime committed.87 Abad was convicted and sentenced to 188 months.ss Aref was convicted and
sentenced to 51 months for his relatively minor role. s9
In 2014, Abad's nephew, Mufid Elfgeeh, was caught through confidential informants in the
same situation as Abad - sending money out of a small shop in New York to terrorist organizations
in the Middle East. 90 Mufid recruited the FBI informants to join ISIL as fighters, paying their
79
80
81
82

Id. at 111.
Id. at 110.
Id.

Elfieeh, 515 F.3 at 110 (recalling that Section 1960 requires compliance with money transmitting business registration
requirements).
83
Id. at 111.
84
Id. at 113 (believing the defense opened the door during its opening statement: "every bit of [the] money came from
a decent source, not criminal activity." Since opening statements do not constitute evidence at trial, the door was not
opened.).
85
Id. at 114 (arguing a mistrial when the Criminal Investigator responsible for uncovering ties to the Yemeni terrorist Al
Mo[a]yad unveiled his identity on the stand, thereby inferring Abad's involvement in a terrorism investigation).
86
Id. at 113 (according to the government outside of the presence of the jury, the money was transmitted to known
terrorist organizations, in "checks that say for the Jihad from the defendant himself").
87
Elfieeh, 515 F.3 at 139 (seeing no disparity between the conviction of the defendants in Elfieeh and the convictions of
defendants with similar conduct and similar criminal backgrounds).
88
Id. (noting that the sentences were within the applicable sentencing guideline ranges).
89
Id. at 128 (contending on appeal that the district court failed to canvass the jury to determine whether any juror had
been exposed to prejudicial media coverage during the court of the trial. The court agreed the proceedings were "a bit
haphazard," but saw no basis for reversal).
90
See Corine Lestch, Rochester Store Owner Charged With Funding ISIS, Plotting to Kill U.S. Troops, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/ news/ national/ rochester-store-owner-charged-funding-isis-plotting-killu-s-troops-article- l. 1942754 (specifically naming "the Islamic terror group ISIS); see also New York Man Sentenced to
Over 22 Years in Prison for Attempting to Recruit Fighters for !SIL, DEPT. OF JusTICE (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.justice.
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passport costs and contacting travel agents for their trip "to the university." 91 These efforts were
coordinated through an English-speaking ISIL contact in Syria. 92 Mufid was arrested by the Joint
Terrorism Task Force in the Rochester region for sending jihadists to Syria to fight with ISIL and
plotting murders of United States troops at home. 93 An affidavit in support of a search warrant in his
case contained "tweets" linking Mufid to jihadists: ''Al Qaeda said it loud and clear: we are fighting
the American invasion and their hegemony over the earth and the people ... [ISIS] will one day rule
the world with the will of Allah." 94 Another tweet urged Muslims to donate a third of their money to
IS, or "#Five_thousand_dollars_from_every_household." 95
Mufid was indicted on three counts of aiding an "Islamic terrorist organization." 96 His
indictment included ''Attempt to Provide Material Support to a Terrorist Organization'' in Counts
One through Three, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2339B(a)(l). 97 Other counts charged Mufid
with attempting to kill United States soldiers and possessing firearms and silencers. 98 Mufid pleaded
guilty to attempting to provide material support to ISIL99 and, on March 17, 2016, was sentenced to
270 months in prison; the longest-ever sentence for supporting a terrorist organization. 100
The two Eljgeeh cases show how much the United States has hardened its stance on terrorist
financing and hawala. Both trials centered on the same two issues: 1) unlicensed money-transmitting
businesses, and 2) material support to designated terrorist organizations - but handled the issues in
markedly different ways. 101 The Eastern District of New York evaded references to terrorism during
gov/opa/pr/new-york-man-sentenced-over-22-years-prison-attempting-recruit-fighters-isil.
91
Greg Botelho, Feds: NY Store Owner Plotted to Sendjihadists to Syria, Kill U.S. Troops himself, CNN (Sept. 18, 2014),
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/16/justice/suspected-isis-supporter-ny/index.html (adding that Mufid was largely a
financial supporter, but also exported those willing to go to war as jihadists).
92
DEPT. OF JusTICE, supra note 90 (explaining that Mufid assisted two individuals, "A" and "B," in joining ISIL, and
contributed at least $240 to individual B for logistical expenses associated with travel to Syria. Previously, Mufid had sent
$600 a Yemeni man for his travel to Syria to join the Islamic State).
93
Lestch, supra note 90 (reporting attempts to gun down government officers and employees; an informant agreed to
secure a 9mm handgun and silencer for $600 so Mufid could kill American troops and Shiite Muslims in the area).
94
Botelho, supra note 91 (revealing Mufid's history of opposition to United States policy following airstrikes against
ISIS).
95
Botelho, supra note 91 (stressing that, by urging households to donate one-third of their salary, Mufid was advertising
the importance of supporting ISIS financially).
96
Indictment, No. 6:14-CR-06147-EAW-JWF, United States v. Elfgeeh (WD.N.Y Sept. 16, 2014); see Botelho, supra
note 91 (statement from then-Attorney General Eric Holder) ("We will remain aggressive in identifying and disrupting
those who seek to provide support to ISIL and other terrorist groups that are bent on inflicting harm upon Americans .
. . We are focused on breaking up these activities on the front end, before supporters ofISIL can make good on plans to
travel to the region or recruit sympathizers to this cause.").
97
Indictment, E/fieeh, No. 6:14-CR-06147-EAW-JWF.
98
Indictment, E/fieeh, No. 6:14-CR-06147-EAW-JWF.
99
DEPT. OF JusTICE, supra note 90 (noting that Mufid's case presents one of the first convictions for an ISIL recruiter
captured in the United States, but efforts to defeat ISIL will require ongoing efforts and public support).
100
Jack Moore, U.S. Pizzeria Owner Handed Longest-Ever Sentence for Supporting ISIS, NEWSWEEK (March 18, 2016),
http://www.newsweek.com/us-man-handed-longest-ever-sentence-supporting-isis-43833 l (quoting United States
District Judge Elizabeth A. Wolford of the Western District of New York that Mufid is "one of the first ISIL recruiters
ever captured" by United States authorities).
101
Compare supra note 84 and accompanying text, with supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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Abad's trial in 2004; 12 years later, the Western District of New York structured its holding on
Mufid's association with ISIL. 102
On the first issue, Abad maintained he was outside of the scope of Section 1960 because he
did not realize his hawala was considered a business requiring a license to operate. 103 On the surface,
there exists tension between hawala as a historically legitimate remittance system and the post-9/11
version of Section 1960 that criminalizes unlicensed money transmitting businesses. 104 This tension,
however, only manifests when a hawala refuses to obtain a license. Hawala is not by its definition
an unlicensed money transmitting system; it is an alternative remittance system that is amenable
to licensing and reporting requirements, despite most readily existing outside of licensed banking
activity. 105 If a hawaladar obtains a license for his business, he will not be subject to Section 1960's
penalties. 106 If the hawaladar does not obtain a license, instead claiming ignorance of the law, he will
fall victim to Section 1960's reduced mens rea requirement. 107 Looking at the range between Abad's
and Mufid's convictions, it is clear the United States is actively targeting the more discrete ways
financiers raise and move money. 108
On the second issue, Abad was found to have connections to terrorist groups, largely
conceding his relationship with an individual closely affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and yet the
government was restricted from arguing this association. 109 Instead, the government relied on Abad's
bank records and was only able to implicate Abad in the illegal operation of an unlicensed money
transmitting business. 110 The court should not have been expected to create a correlation where one
did not exist, but it should have confronted the reality of a hawaladar wiring money out to Yemen

102

Compare infta note 109 and accompanying text, with supra note 100 and accompanying text.
United States v. Elfgeeh, 515 F.3d 100,106 (2d Cir. 2008), affg United States v. Elfgeeh, 2004 WL 3767299 at
*l (E.D.N.Y Jun. 9, 2004) (presenting the Defense's case that Aref did not consider the hawala a "business" within the
meaning of§ 1960(a) because he transmitted money only for Yemeni-American individuals, not businesses, and only
charged the amount necessary to cover banking and delivery fees).
104
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1960(a) (stating "[w]hoever knowingly conducts, controls, manages, supervises, directs, or owns
all or part of an unlicensed money transmitting business, shall be fined ... or imprisoned ... or both.").
105
But cf E/fieeh, 515 F.3d at 108 (quoting FBI Special Agent Daniel Gill on the benefits of hawala over official moneytransmitting businesses: "it's conducted outside the realm oflicensed banking activity. There is no regulatory oversight.
Therefore, the transactions are basically conducted without any sort oflegal review ... ").
106
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1960(a) (intentionally amending the federal statue to criminalize operation of money transmitting
businesses to eliminate the requirement of proof that the defendant knew a license was required. Now, the government is
only required to prove that the defendant knew the business was unlicensed).
107
See Andrew Schouten, Unlicensed Money Transmitting Businesses under the USA PATRIOT ACT, 39 MCGEORGE
L. REv. 1097, 1105 (2008) (explaining that the USA PATRIOT ACT "clarified the mens rea requirement for section
1960" when it replaced intentionally with knowingly); see also United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 539 (2d Cir. 1995)
(explaining how changing "willfully'' to "knowingly'' reduces the mens rea element and heightens criminal sanctions).
108
See E/fieeh, 515 F.3d at 111 (refusing to accept the excuse that Abad was unaware of the New York State licensing
requirement when he began transmitting money for Yemeni community members in 1995).
109
Id. at 116-17 (barring mentions ofElfgeeh's relationship with Yemeni cleric Mohammed Ali Hassan Al-Moayad,
who was convicted of conspiring to provide material support to Hamas and Al Qaeda and called himself Osama Bin
Laden's "personal sheik'').
110
See id. at 143-44 (discussing heavily the effect of pre-trial publicity on the district court's requirement that the jury
remain unaware that the prosecution was terrorism-related).
103
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and twenty-five similarly-situated countries through checks saying "for the jihad." 111 When this
link was acknowledged in Mufid's trial, he received the steepest sentence ever handed to a terrorist
sympathizer. 112 Perhaps our treatment has evolved because the threat has evolved. 113 If we feared
another 9/11 from Al-Qaeda, 114 we fear a "lone wolf" attack from ISIL. 115 These sporadic attacks are
often smaller scale, but they are pointedly destructive in their ability to shock the conscious. ISIL is
not predictable and is not structured. This may have rattled the United States' understanding of the
enemy, but it did not rattle the means through which the United States can degrade the enemy. 116
While it is often difficult to pinpoint an individual offender in a collective mission, complicity is
crucial in enforcing the full breadth and intent of post 9/11 terrorism legislation.
By conceding inadequacies in its counterterrorism strategy pre-9/11, 117 the United States has
set the example of how to push back on ISIL financially. This progress, however, will be hindered
unless the international community concedes similar inadequacies. As a region, the Middle East has
a clear record of backing terrorist organizations, including Al Qaeda, yet acquiesces to hawaladars
because of trust and tradition. 118 Understanding these deficiencies in the Middle East is crucial in
recognizing the limitations of United States regulations.

IV.

HAWALA REGULATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Throughout most of the Middle East, hawala is "nothing more than an informal wage
remittance service" for guest workers. 119 This characterization has stalled legislation regulating the
system.
Afghanistan and Iraq, and to a lesser degree, Syria, complied with international
recommendations after 9/11 and passed legislation against terrorist financing. 120 While the
111
112
113

Id. at 117.
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
Compare Indictment, E/fieeh, No. 6:14-CR-06147-EAW-JWF, with Superseding Indictment, E/fieeh, No. 1:03-CR-

00133-SJ (looking at an indictment carrying 65 years against an indictment carrying 15 years).
114
See generally MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING, supra note 28, at 17 (namely, Al-Qaeda was recognized for its
ability to develop "an elusive network ... an unconventional web" of financial facilitators, including hawaladars).
115
See Beyond bin Laden's Caves and Couriers to a New Generation o/Terrorists: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland
Sec., l l 4th Cong. 2 (2015) (testimony of William]. Bratton, New York City Police Commissioner) (explaining that
ISIL has "shunned" Al Qaeda's model for the "lone wolf" model, and has been subsequently more successful at delivering
direct impacts).
116
Id. at 3 (describing how the NYPD has strengthened its partnerships to better study terrorist groups, trends, and
methods of attack).
117

See The 9111 Commission and Efforts to IdentiJY and Combat Terrorist Financing: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 3 (2004) [hereinafter Wolosky] (testimony of Lee S. Wolosky, of
Counsel, Boles, Shiller & Flexner LLP) ("Prior to 9/11, the intelligence community had an 'incomplete understanding of
Al-Qaeda's methods to raise, move, and store money,' which hampered the effectiveness of the overall counterterrorism
strategy.").
118
See generally Bowers, supra note 2, at 384 (explaining that community tradition create a distrust of outsiders, which
eliminates commercial competition from the outside).
119
CASSARA, supra note 49, at 149.
120
See infta notes 130, 140, 146 and accompanying text.
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effectiveness of these laws is difficult to ascertain, the enactment alone is commendable in places
lacking formal sector alternatives. 121 Still, the International Monetary Fund recognizes that progress
is necessarily impeded in countries without a functional banking system. 122
In Saudi Arabia and Qatar, authorities have demonstrated a "penchant for passing legislation
and considering the matter closed without any implementation or enforcement." 123 The situation is
similar in the United Arab Emirates, the host of the first International Hawala Conference. 124

A. Nothing More Than an Informal Wllge Remittance System?
Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria
During the reign of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, hawala emerged as a reliable
alternative to the existing financial sector, which became virtually non-operational after more than
twenty years of conflict. 125 Hawala is still trusted over formal institutions, especially after the 2010
Kabul Bank scandal, when owners lost more than $900 million of depositors' money through insider
loans. 126 Now, only seven percent of Afghans have a bank account. 127 Most hawaladars in Afghanistan
operate in the Kabul money exchange market - an eighty-year-old market housing precious-metal
transfers and financial services offices. 128 These hawaladars are considered a "financial institution" 129
under Afghanistan's 2004 Anti-Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Law as a "money
transmutation service." 130 As such, they must take active steps to verify the identity of customers, 131

121

See Maimbo, supra note 20, at 19 (suggesting that when banks failed, the hawala system filled the financial void, and
has since been trusted over formal institutions).
122
WORLD BANK AND INT'L MONETARY FUND, INFORMAL FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMAL
HAWALA SYSTEM 41 (2003), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP /IB/2003/05/03/000
094946_03041904002082/Rendered/PDF/multiOpage.pdf (contrasting countries where informal hawala systems exist
alongside a well-functioning conventional banking sector with conflict torn countries without a functional banking
system. For the latter, requirements beyond basic registration may not be feasible because of inadequate supervisory
capacity).
123
Levitt, supra note 46 (attributing the money exchange dealers to a diverse financial market).
124
See infta note 121 and accompanying text.
125
Maimbo, supra note 20, at 1 (explaining the erosion of the formal financial sector during a period when Afghanistan
was subjected to international sanctions).
126
EltafNajafizadas, Afghans Start to Take the Money and Run, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (July 12, 2012), http://www.
bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2012-07-12/afghans-start-to-take-the-money-and-run.
121
128

Id.
See Maimbo, supra note 20, at 3 (attributing the diverse financial market to hawaladars, who provide a range of

banking conveniences).
129
Anti Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Law 2004 art. 2 (Afg.); THE FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS AND REPORTS
ANALYSIS CENTER OF AFGHANISTAN, http://www.fintraca.gov.af/ (last visited May 6, 2016) [hereinafter FINTRACAJ
(fighting against the use of financial institutions for money laundering and proceeds of crime, including the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism financing).
130
Anti Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Law art. 5 (requiring any transfer to or from foreign countries
involving a sum equal or exceeding 1,000,000 Afghani to be effected through an authorized financial invitation or an
authorized money transmission service).
131
Id. art 9.
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monitor transactions, 132 engage in record-keeping, 133 and report suspicious activity. 134 Since the
legislation was enacted in 2004, 300 registered money exchange dealers have organized themselves
into a self-regulating market. 135 This transparency is crucial in identifying illicit transactions in
Kandahar, the birthplace of the Taliban. 136
In Iraq, hawala's legality turns on whether the money exchangers are licensed. 137 Hawala, in
its ancient understanding, was unregulated and prohibited throughout most of Saddam Hussein's
reign. 138 Nevertheless, hawala was still widely used to transfer funds from expatriate communities,
as the only solution to the challenges imposed by the restrictive banking system. 139 The Iraq
Banking Law was enacted in 2003 following renewed international cooperation after 9/11. 140 The
Law promotes understanding of the banking system and attaches penalties to all persons engaged
in banking business without a banking license, with certain exemptions. 141 The following year,
the government passed the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Law, governing financial institutions
and their relationship to terrorism financing. 142 "Persons who undertake hawala transactions" are
explicitly included within "money transmitters,'' whether direct or indirect, formal or informal. 143
The penalty for terrorist financing and money laundering ranges from two to four years'
imprisonment, including a fine of 20 million to 40 million dinar, respectively. 144
Syria was designated a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1979 and remains a serious source of
terrorist financing. 145 Syria required money-changers to be licensed by the end of 2007, but rather
132
133
134

Id. art 12 (requiring reporting entities to pay special attention to all complex, unusual large transactions).
Id. art 14.
Id. art 9 (targeting suspects whose transactions are related to or derived from the commission of an offense and any

funds linked to terrorism).
135
Maimbo, supra note 20, at 3 (adding that the number of unregistered money exchange dealers in Afghanistan range
from 500 to 2,000); see FrnTRACA, supra note 129.
136
See EltafNajafizadas, supra note 126 (citing a United States Bureau oflnternational Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs report predicting that Kandahar and Hemland handle one billion dollars in drug money a year).
137
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, COMPREHENSIVE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE DCI ON IRAQS WMD
(2007), https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-l/iraq_wmd_2004/chap2_annxG.html [hereinafter CIA,
IRAQ] (differentiating between hawalas through banks, which are legal, and hawalas through encrypted notes from
family-tribal relationships, which are illegal).
138
Id. (adding that the entire system was eventually legalized by Saddam Hussein to reduce illicit smuggling).
139
Id. (inferring that hawala was the most common informal payment system because it was illegal to transfer cash out
of the country using the normal banking system).
140
Banking Law of2003 art. 2 (Iraq) (adding the other objectives of promoting understanding of the banking system
and maintaining protection for depositors).
141
Id. art. 3 (including within exemptions, "persons who fund the credits they make ... " or "persons who, in exchange
for the issuance of corporate debentures or corporate bonds, receive repayable funds from the public and use such funds
solely for the purpose of making investments for their own account").
142
Anti-Money Laundering Law of2004 art. 1 (Iraq) (stipulating that it is a crime to "launder money, finance crime,
finance terrorism, and structure transactions;" "financial institutions" encompasses managers of investment funds,
insurance institutions, persons trading in securities, money transmitters, and foreign exchange houses).
143
Id. art. 2 (including within the definition of "financial institution'' anyone who accepts, keeps, deposits, invests, or
transfers financial assets. The CBI can refine the definition of financial institution based on size).
144
Id. art. 4 (defining "Terrorist Financing" as providing property, support, or financial services used to carry out an act
for a terrorist group or an act intended to cause seriously bodily harm to a civilian in a situation of armed conflict).
145
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM: STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM (2011), http://www.state.
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than comply with legislation, these money-changers took their efforts to the black market. 146 Hawala
networks largely exist in Syria's black market, perpetuating trade-based money laundering. 147 This
market has grown almost as large as Syria's formal economy; 60% of all business transactions are
conducted in cash and 80% of the population rejects formal banking services. 148 Ultimately, Syria has
refused to confront rampant corruption within its borders. 149
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria are plagued by instability and foreign interference, making it
difficult to regulate the informal financial sector. 150 These countries lack reporting laws, uniform
guidelines, or methods of monitoring the cross-border movement of currency. 151 On a fundamental
level, many people engaging in financial transactions face language barriers when attempting to
communicate with formal institutions. 152
Hawaladars in Afghanistan provide a valuable resource against unskilled human resources,
outdated technology, and weaknesses in corporate governance. 153 Afghanistan has made efforts to
enforce its 2004 Anti-Money Laundering Law, but maintains that hawala-type systems, even as they
circumvent officialdom, are not inherently suspect. 154 To the Western word, this may register as an
excuse, but hawala does not exist in the Western world under the same circumstances it exists in
Afghanistan. 155 Hawala was created in response to the corruption of the formal sector; if Afghanis are
pointing to a suspect system, they will point to the banks. 156 If there are no real alternatives to the
hawala system in Afghanistan, the United States should focus on deepening Afghanistan's compliance
with Financial Action Task Force recommendations rather than criminalizing the system. 157
As in Afghanistan, hawala has been largely beneficial for the Iraqi community, which
decreases Iraq's motivation to regulate the system. 158 Iraq's Banking Law only applies to persons
carrying on a "commercially organized business undertaking,'' thereby exempting most hawaladars
gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2010/170260.htm (stating that Syria provided political and weapons support to Hizballah in Lebanon,
and harbored the Palestine Islamic Jihad and the popular Front for the Formation of Palestine).
146
141
148
149
150
151

Id.
Id.
Id. (detailing wide-spread corruption in Syria).
See id. (regretting that members of the Syrian government may be complicit in terrorist financing schemes).
See supra notes 125, 139, 149 and accompanying text.
See generally MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING, supra note 28, at 25 (postulating that Al-Qaeda had no choice

but to move money through hawala before 9/11 since the banking system in Afghanistan is antiquated).
152
See Bowers, supra note 2, at 417 (tying in linguistics with the incentive of cultural familiarity).
153
See Bowers, supra note 2, at 383 (attributing the success ofhawala in Afghanistan to civil conflict leading to an
absence of traditional financial institutions).
154
See generally Bowers, supra note 2, at 413 (explaining that this circumvention actually hurts the governments of
poorer nations whose individuals benefit from informal flows).
155
See Maimbo, supra note 20, at 33 (recognizing that, historically, hawala-type systems commonplace and are
particularly useful in places requiring an avenue for migrant labor remittances, humanitarian support, and emergency
aid).
156
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
157
See Bowers, supra note 2, at 392-95 (stating that the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations were created in
1989 to combat money laundering and have since added nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing. Special
Recommendation 6 calls for either licensing or registration of money transfer systems).
158
See CIA, IRAQ, supra note 137 (reporting that the system reduces liquid cash and has countered the effects of
inflation).
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from its penalties. 159 Even if a hawaladar did operate a banking business on this scale, he must
know how to exploit statutory loopholes; the government of Saddam certainly did when it used
private banks rather than the state owned bank to hide transactions from the UN . 160 The deterrent
of four years' imprisonment in the AML Law should compel hawaladars to license their business,
keep thorough records, and recognize illicit transactions, but the mens rea requirement is still too
low. 161 Not long ago, the United States faced similar problems when attempting to identify illegal
hawaladars, as discussed above, but imposed new standards to purify the system. 162 Without similar
requirements, Iraq's legislation leaves considerable space for "underground" transactions.
According to the United States Department of State, Syria enacts legislation not for the
benefit of its own people, but to repress outsiders and combat interference against its interests. 163
This is certainly true for Syria's AML legislation, which is often overlooked in conversation because
of how capriciously it is disregard. 164 Of course, Syria has forsaken most of its rule of law amid
long-lasting internal turmoil. 165 The instability of the financial sector is a small symptom of a more
complicated collapse. 166
In these countries, hawala primarily exists to avoid government interaction, not to fund
terrorism. 167 There is a deep distrust of the formal sector, often for understandable reasons, and
comfort in the tradition and familiarity of hawala. 168 Hawala is most likely to remain in this
region, which is acceptable as long as it is regulated. 169 To outlaw hawala entirely would potentially
signal an imposition of Western ideals; rather, the United States should embolden the more broad
participation against terrorist financing the Middle East has exhibited post-9/11.

159

Banking Law of2003, supra note 140, art. 3 (continuing that no system may use the word "bank'' without a banking
license. The process for obtaining a license is stipulated in articles 4-5).
160
See CIA, IRAQ, supra note 137.
161
Andrew Hudson & Maitha A!Hashimi, Iraq's New Draft Anti-Money Laundering Law, AL TAMIMI & Co. (Oct.,
2015), http://www.tamimi.com/en/magazine/law-update/section-11/october-5/iraqs-new-draft-anti-money-launderinglaw.html (discussing new AML draft legislation in Iraq that would broaden the mens rea to implicate an offender ifhe
"ought to have known'' that the funds were the proceeds of crime).
162
See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
163
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 145 (indicating that only opponents of the regime were charged with violating
counterterrorism statutes).
164
See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
165
See generally N .Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/ news/international/ countriesandterritories/syria/index.html
(last visited May 6, 2016).
166
167
168
169

See id.
See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
See generally Maimbo, supra note 20, at 17 (realizing that a lack of documentation makes it difficult to answer

whether hawala is used to launder money in Afghanistan, and suggesting special regulations or supervision techniques to
increase hawala's transparency).

Vol. 6, No. 2

"BLACK' HAWALA

75

B. Consider the Matter Closed
The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar
The United Arab Emirates is "an integral part of the international hawala equation,''
primarily because of its ties to Al-Barakaat, headquartered in Dubai. 170 Al-Barakaat is a moneytransfer system previously investigated for ties to Al-Qaeda. 171 After United States Intelligence
learned Osama bin Laden contributed money to Al-Barakaat, the United States froze assets from its
operation and designated it a supporter of terrorist organizations. 172 To control the negative publicity
surrounding Al-Barakaat, the United Arab Emirates held the first International Conference on
hawala, offering a voluntary system of registration for hawala dealers. 173 This initiative supplemented
Union Law No. 10 (1980) and Resolution No. 31/2/1986 & No. 123/792 against terrorist
financing, which require licensing for all money changing businesses in the United Arab Emirates. 174
New banking initiatives and outreach programs in Saudi Arabia suggest future progress in the
Middle East. 175 The Saudi Banking Control Law punishes persons who engage in unlicensed banking
businesses with up to two years imprisonment and a fine of 5,000 Saudi Riyals (SRI) for every day
the offense continues. 176 "Banking business" is defined quite broadly in the Law and includes actions
such as receiving money on deposit accounts, opening accounts, collecting checks, and facilitating
foreign exchange transactions. 177 Saudi Arabia has also taken measures to identify terrorist financing
within its "charity commissions,'' which regulate export of all funds and distribute private donations
from Saudi Arabia. 178 When Saudi Arabia discovered a notable charity commission, Al Haramain,

° CASSARA, supra note 49, at 149 (expressing frustration with his Emirati colleagues' insistence that the majority of
hawala transactions are benign, but acknowledging their progressive efforts to regulate the system after 9111).
171
CASSARA, supra note 49, at 198 (explaining that Al Barakaat "filled a banking need" for the expatriate Somali
community, who did not have access to financial institutions during and after the Somali civil war).
172
CASSARA, supra note 49, at 198 (detailing how the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation became involved in investigating
the financial trail leading from Somali terrorists to Dubai; ultimately, the criminal investigation failed to establish a link
between Al Barakaat and terrorism).
173
See Suha Maayeh, Hawala Money Transfers DefY Regulation Efforts, NATIONAL (Aug. 26, 2008), http://www.
thenational.ae/news/uae-news/hawala-money-transfers-defy-regulation-efforts (noting that, since 2002 when the U.A.E
organized the first international conference on hawala, more than 260 traders have registered; once registered, hawaladars
must disclose names of customers and the purpose of remittances).
174
Concerning the Central Bank, Law No. 10of1980 art. 2-5 (U.A.E) (establishing the Central Bank of the United
Arab Emirates to direct monetary credit and banking policy and advise the Government); Regarding Regulating of
Money Changing Business in the U.A.E, Res. No. 123/7/92of1992, art. 2 (exempting certain businesses from the
licensing requirement).
175
See, e.g., Charles Lister, Cutting offISIS' Cash Flow, BROOKINGS (Oct. 24, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/
markaz/posts/2014/ 10/24-lister-cutting-off-isis-jabhat-al-nusra-cash-flow (recognizing initiatives in Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates "appear to have made some headway," in comparison to Kuwait and Qatar).
176
Banking Control Law No. M/5of1966 art. 23 (Saudi Arabia) (associating higher penalties with certain provisions,
imposing the greatest fine for disclosing sensitive information and the lowest fine for failing to appoint auditors and
developing a monthly statement).
177
Id. art. 1.
178
MONOGRAPH ON TERRORIST FINANCING, supra note 28, at 11-12 (defining Al Haramain Islamic Foundation as
a "quasi-private, charitable, and educational organization dedicated to propagating a very conservative form oflslam
throughout the world." Al Haramain's expenditures ranged from $30 to $80 million at its peak).
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supported jihadists and terrorists, including al Qaeda, it froze the assets of its branches and developed
new commissions to take over overseas aid operations. 179
Qatar explicitly criminalizes terrorism financing in Law No. 4 of 2010. 180 The law requires
identity verification and record maintenance for all financial institutions, defined as anyone
conducting a financial operation for the benefit of a customer. 181 The purpose of the law is to
identify money laundering, or the transfer of illicit funds from crime. 182 The penalty for terrorism
financing ranges from three to ten years; this penalty is doubled where the perpetrator was assisted by
a terrorist organization. 183 The Qatari Authority for Charitable Activities approves international fund
transfers by domestic and international charities and the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) reviews
all financial transaction reports and identifies suspicious transactions. 184 Prosecutors are required to
freeze funds of UN-designated terrorist organizations; the National Anti-Terrorism committee can
designate terrorists independently of the UN, but no delegations were made as of 2013. 185
Qatar possibly presents the biggest frustration to the international community because it
defies its potential to inspire future compliance with anti-money laundering legislation using its
own model. 186 Qatar's new regulations are inclusive and direct, but will only amount to anything
if they are implemented, which is unlikely given the country's history of introducing laws without
enforcement. 187 The government has the authority to confiscate, freeze, or seize funds tied to
terrorism financing, but, so far, no funds have been confiscated. 188 Quite opposite, Qatar is
considered a "safe harbor" for persons designated under the United Nations terrorism designation
list, UNSCR 1267. 189 Qatar claims no hawaladars operate within the country, even though there are
documented instances of businessmen sending hundreds of thousands of dollars to Al-Qaeda in Iraq
(AQI/ISIL) and the Arabian Peninsula via Al-Qaeda's representatives in Syria. 190
179

See CASSARA, supra note 49, at 204 (commending Saudi officials for finally recognizing they had a problem with
charitable procedures by mid-2004, and closing down the Al Haramain Foundation for providing support to Al-Qaeda).
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Levitt, supra note 46 (characterizing the implementation of anti-money laundering laws in the Middle East as
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188
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A reluctance to abide by terrorist financing legislation is not unique to Qatar. In the U.A.E,
hawala is unapologetically legal; still, hawaladars do not want to register. 191 The international
community applauded the Abu Dhabi International Conference on Hawala, but did not question
why most hawaladars at the Conference were still unregistered. 192 At the Second International
Conference in 2004, the mission statement discouraged "over-regulation that might drive [Informal
Funds Transfer systems] operations underground." 193 Hawaladars in attendance were not, in other
words, focused on how to regulate their activity; to the contrary, they were focused on how to retain
anonymity. 194 Their reasons for preserving secrecy may not be malicious, but it certainly does not
help increase transparency and accountability. 195 One has to wonder why, if hawala is legal and funds
are legitimate, so many hawaladars are reluctant to reveal their businesses. 196
Saudi Arabia has been praised for improving regulations in their financial sector. 197 Indeed,
Saudi Arabia has made significant strides in establishing charity commissions and controlling the
licensing of money-transmitters. 198 Still, sharia presents a deterrent to modernization, as it permeates
every facet of life in Saudi Arabia, including the judiciary. 199 Fundamentally, it is debatable whether
the rule of law can ever be fully enforced in a region that abides by a Wahhabi ban on manmade
legislation. 200 The United States should continue to motivate progressive change in Saudi Arabia
to buttress its stable relationship, but, ultimately, the Saudi government has failed in sanctioning
terrorist financiers. 201
Many countries in the Middle East have struggled to effectively regulate their informal
financial sector, for reasons both beyond and in their control. 202 The region's response to terrorist
financing and money laundering is indisputably more consolidated and cooperative post-9/11, but
191

See Bowers, supra note 2, at 385 (wondering why most hawaladars refused to come forward at the Abu Dhabi
International Conference on Hawala).
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See Bowers, supra note 2, at 385.
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196
See generally Bowers, supra note 2, at 385 (lamenting that when then-United States Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neil
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removed the night before).
197
See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
198
See Wolosky, supra note 118 (recognizing that Saudi Arabia has worked hard to impose regulations).
199
See generally Bowers, supra note 2, at 409 (noting every law in Saudi Arabia is governed by the following stipulation:
"The system of judges which is applied to all cases presented before it is Shari' a rules according to the teachings of the
Holy Qur'an, the Sunnah, and the regulations set by the ruler, provided they do not contradict the Holy Qur'an and the
Sunnah'').
200
See generally Bowers, supra note 2, at 409 (citing Article 7 of the Nizam Asasi "Basic Regulation," the closest
equivalent to a constitution, reflecting the "Prophet's tradition and the Qur'an," which reign supreme over all state
regulations).
201
See Wolosky, supra note 118, at 3 (describing a lack of oversight in Saudi Arabia, due to the Saudi government's
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hawaladars are still unregulated, for the most part. 203 While these regions lack the incentives to more
stringently regulate hawala on their own, the United States cannot expect to enforce regulations
unilaterally.

v. A HAWALA CONVENTION
Because hawala is legitimately operated in many countries, the system should not be
outlawed entirely. 204 This would do little to deter hawaladars in the Middle East, who already largely
work underground. 205 Instead, the United States and Middle East should enter into an agreement
against the illicit use of hawala, in the form of an international convention. This hawala-specific
convention would supplement the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, which never explicitly mentions hawala. 206
The Terrorist Financing Convention was adopted by the General Assembly on December
9, 1999, with 132 signatories and 186 parties. 207 The Convention imposes the responsibility to
report offenses relating to terrorist financing in the jurisdiction where the offense occurs. 208 This is
an admirable goal, but given the "new level [s]" of terrorist financing, 209 a new treaty could refine the
scope of the Convention. An international agreement on hawala, specifically could consolidate goals
at various international levels, and ensure compliance with pre-existing domestic regulation. On a
more fundamental level, it could provide a uniform understanding of the problem.
The basic framework should center on non-intervention - in regulating the informal
financial sector, no country may impede on the domestic sovereignty of another jurisdiction. 210
This is especially important for hawala, given the disparities in cultural perception. Because illicit
financing affects states outside of where the offense was initially committed, signatories may
feel compelled to interfere with capital movement. Nevertheless, parties to the convention must
respect the jurisdictions established by the State Parties. Otherwise, we risk disrupting economic
independence.
203
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of the United Nations of the jurisdiction it has established, per Article 7).
209
Alexandra Marks, Terror Finance: Two High Stakes Cases, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Dec. 24, 2002), http://
www.csmonitor.com/2004/1224/p02s01-usju.html (statement of Lee Wolosky) ("It's a sign that the war against
terrorism is moving to a new level ... What you're seeing now is a focus on something that's really hard to get at-the
nonstructured modes of terrorist financing.").
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See generally Financing ofTerrorism, supra note 206, 2178 U.N.T.S. at 238 (requiring State Parties to carry out their
obligations in a "manner consistent with the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States.").
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Several provisions of the 1999 Convention could be carried over to the new convention,
with increased emphasis. The Terrorist Financing Convention asks Parties to consider measures for
supervision, including the licensing of money-transmitting agencies. 211 In the Hawala Convention,
this licensing would have to be a requirement, not a suggestion. Hawaladars in the Middle East
currently have too much discretion in deciding whether registration requirements apply to their
operation. 212 When the United States amended its money-transmitting licensing provisions, it
ushered in a new era of heightened accountability that demands the apprehension of terrorist
sympathizers. 213 It is clear the United States considers terrorist financing a foreign policy issue, not
a domestic regulatory issue, but it is less clear the Middle East shares that viewpoint. 214 The 1999
Convention asks Parties to communicate offenses to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 215
but perhaps the Parties should first establish an understanding of what constitutes an offense. The
exchange of information through the UN and Interpol could help identify criminal activity in the
future by identifying common elements.
Ultimately, a hawala-specific convention would fulfill the same purpose as the Convention
against Terrorist Financing, namely, to ensure "the maintenance of international peace and security
and the promotion of good-neighbourliness and friendly relations and cooperation among States." 216
In State Parties lacking adequate domestic legislation, the 1999 Convention highlighted the
appropriate measures for the identification and detection of funds allocated for terrorist financing. 217
This type of guidance could be instrumental in regulating hawala according to pre-existing domestic
legislation and international expectations. Just as the 1999 Convention was necessary in the absence
of multilateral legal instruments addressing terrorist financing, a new Hawala Convention may be
necessary after 9/11. 218
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CONCLUSION

ISIL gains recruits every day. The support allows the organization to thrive - militarily and
financially. 219 The latter is especially destructive, as ISIL has discovered how to manipulate a younger
generation into providing material support for its terrorist activities.
The Middle East is a dynamic player in the conversation on hawala. On the one hand,
Middle Eastern countries have a personal stake in stopping ISIL, which should theoretically translate
into a substantial interest in regulating terrorist financing. On the other hand, hawala is ingrained
in the culture and trusted as a legitimate business practice. Countries like Saudi Arabia, U.A.E, and
Qatar, which have the legislation required to prosecute illicit money transfers, are not compensating
for instability in the conflict-torn regions of Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq.
The United States has enforced a broader interpretation of its legislation against the illicit
use of hawala, signaling a more combative response to ISIL funding. Even so, hawala transcends
boundaries and controls; without the cooperation of the rest of the world, particularly in the regions
where terrorist financing is either directed or initiated, the United States faces an uphill battle in
regulating the system. The battle is winnable, but the value of the victory will diminish if it arrives
too late in the war.
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